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Of Trayvon Martin, George Zimmerman,
and Legal Expressivism: Why
Massachusetts Should Stand its Ground
on "Stand Your Ground"
Louis N. SCHULZE, JR.
INTRODUCTIONM y students were positively glaring at me. The normal collective
visage of polite attention from these ninety-six, first-year
Criminal Law students had transformed into expressions of
disbelief. I had just said something that, apparently, they found quite
controversial, even though I didn't really mean it to have that effect. It was
quite clear that everyone in the class was silently demanding a justification
for my contentious thesis. It was late March 2012, we had just begun our
study of affirmative defenses, and we had broached the topic of self-
defense. So, what was my provocative statement?
"The Trayvon Martin case, it seems to me, has nothing to do with
Florida's 'Stand Your Ground' statute whatsoever."
Awkward silence. I was addressing a case that was on everyone's
mind: the killing of African-American teenager Trayvon Martin by
Neighborhood Watch leader George Zimmerman after the latter chased
and confronted the former for allegedly looking suspicious. My statement,
apparently, contradicted every scintilla of information the public was
receiving from media pundits-and one ought not contradict the legal
analysis of the likes of Nancy Grace lightly. For days, the nation was
captivated by the competing narratives of Zimmerman's lethal interaction
with Martin: Was racism Zimmerman's motivation for shooting Martin?
What really happened in that gated community in Florida? Was
institutional racism the underlying cause of failing to arrest Zimmerman?
Was Zimmerman going to get away with this? Amid this fray, the one
issue that seemed absolutely beyond contention was the clear relevance of
* Professor of Law, New England Law I Boston. My thanks to my colleagues Micah Berman,
Victor Hansen, and Lawrence Friedman for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. My
thanks also to my terrific research assistants, Kelsey Baran and Robb Levine, for their
enthusiasm and suggestions.
34
2012 Of Trayvon Martin, George Zimmerman, & Legal Expressivism 35
Florida's "Stand Your Ground" ("SYG") law-stating that one does not
have a duty to retreat before opposing violence with force -thus begetting
a fiery debate in the media about the propriety of such provisions.
Yet after a few weeks, legal scholars and criminal law practitioners
began to claim that the prosecution of George Zimmerman would not
focus on whether he acted in accordance with the SYG statute.' These
predictions proved prescient, as Zimmerman's defense team later
announced that they would instead pursue a "traditional" self-defense
strategy.2 Although his lawyers predicated this decision on their claim that
Zimmerman did not have the opportunity to retreat-a fact that was not
completely available during the initial firestorm over the case-
Zimmerman's initial pursuit of Martin arguably disqualified him from
using SYG, 3 and these facts were known during the initial claims of the
viability of such a defense. Therefore, if the facts disqualifying Zimmerman
from asserting a SYG defense were known all along, why were the media
and public so quick to entertain the false assertion that the law excused
Zimmerman's actions? Put another way, why did our society, including
my students, apparently presume that Florida law might allow one to
pursue and confront a non-aggressor and still claim self-defense?
This Essay will suggest that the expressive effect of SYG laws can alter
the shared norms governing our collective understanding of the moral
limits of "self-defense." This alteration, in turn, led to the common
assumption that SYG laws permit more than they do. To support this
thesis, this Essay briefly explains SYG statutes and legal expressivism. It
then details the nature of the expressive function of these statutes and
asserts that Massachusetts, which recently considered the adoption of such
a provision,4 should reject this change principally to rebuff the symbolic
See, e.g., David Kopel, Florida's Self-Defense Laws, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 27, 2012,
11:59 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/03/27/floridas-self-defense-laws ("[E]veryone who
has claimed that Florida's retreat rule affect[s] the legal disposition of the controversy is either
misinformed or mendacious.").
Kyle Hightower, George Zimmerman's Lawyer, Mark O'Mara, Pursuing Traditional Self
Defense, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 13, 2012, 8:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/08/14/george-zimmermans-lawyer-stand-your-ground n_1775105.html?utmhp
ref=black-voices.
See Julia Dahl, Author of "Stand Your Ground" Law: George Zimmerman Should Probably be
Arrested for Killing Trayvon Martin, CBS NEWS (Mar. 21, 2012, 12:31 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57401619-504083/author-of-stand-your-ground-
law-george-zimmerman-should-probably-be-arrested-for-killing-trayvon-martin (noting that
the statute's authors believed that pursuing Martin disqualified Zimmerman from SYG
defense).
S. 661, 187th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2012), available at http://malegislature.gov/Bills/
BillHtml/9011?generalCourtld=1. The Massachusetts Senate issued a study order for the Bill
on October 15, 2012, effectively tabling the proposal. S. 661, 187th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2012),
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message these laws convey. More generally, this Essay concludes that
legislatures should be careful to understand fully that adopting SYG
provisions may likely result in society's collective reinterpretation of the
appropriate moral boundaries of the use of force.
I. Stand Your Ground and the Zimmerman Prosecution
The common law rule regarding self-defense is that one is privileged to
use deadly force only when one "reasonably believes that its use is
necessary to prevent the imminent and unlawful use of deadly force by an
aggressor."5 In Florida and many other states, one can use such deadly
force without first satisfying the common law requirement to retreat if it is
safe to do so. In other words, under the SYG provisions:
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is
attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be has
no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground
and meet force with force, including deadly force if he or she
reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or
great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent
the commission of a forcible felony. 6
Thus, the only function of such a provision is to answer the question: if
one can retreat safely, must one do so before using deadly force? In
answering in the negative, SYG provisions undo the common law
requirement to retreat.
But, this issue is irrelevant in the Zimmerman prosecution. As David
Kopel has pointed out, there are two conflicting narratives that ultimately
must be sorted out by a jury.7 One story is that Zimmerman stalked Martin,
cornered him, and lethally shot him. If this is indeed the true scenario that
unfolded, Florida's SYG provision is inapplicable because Zimmerman was
engaged in unlawful activity and was the aggressor.' Zimmerman put
forth a conflicting story: he approached Martin, the teenager attacked him,
and, as Martin pinned him to the ground, Martin smashed Zimmerman's
head upon the concrete and told him he was about to die. In this scenario,
the SYG law does not apply because there is no issue whether Zimmerman
had to retreat since he did not have the ability to do so safely.9
available at http://malegislature.gov/Bills/187/Senate/SO0661 (follow link to "Bill History").
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 221 (6th ed. 2012) [hereinafter
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING] (citing United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229 (D.C. Cir.
1973)).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013(3) (West 2012).
Kopel, supra note 1.
See id.
Ashley Hayes, George Zimmerman: Trayvon Martin Threatened My Life, CNN JUSTICE (June
22, 2012, 6:56 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/21/justice/florida-teen-shooting/index.html;
Kopel, supra note 1.
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Why, then, was the nation so fixated on SYG? It is important to
remember for purposes of this Essay's thesis that when news of Martin's
killing broke, the only existing narrative was the first one-that
Zimmerman stalked out Martin and killed him in cold blood. The media
and public perception of the applicability of SYG to that narrative seems
beyond belief. But, it is equally important to remember that when
Zimmerman's alternative narrative was made public, the seemingly
ubiquitous belief in the applicability of the SYG provision continued
unabated. Moreover, even police involved in the case, who knew
Zimmerman's statements, justified their failure to charge Zimmerman on
the SYG provision. It was not until months later, when Zimmerman's
attorneys distanced themselves from a SYG defense, that we collectively
recognized that SYG was irrelevant.
So, why is it that the nation was so slow to realize the blatant
inapplicability of the SYG statute? Why were we mired in a national debate
on the propriety of such laws when it should have been clear that the
killing of Trayvon Martin had nothing to do with SYG provisions? And
why was my Criminal Law class so aghast when I suggested such a notion,
when ultimately it was clearly accurate? I suggest that the answer has
everything to do with the "expressive impact" of SYG laws.
II. What is Legal Expressivism?
A full discussion of the nuances of the expressive value of law is
beyond the scope of this Essay, but a functional definition will help us
understand the impact of SYG laws on social norms. Legal expressivism
holds that law exerts power not only in its ability to change citizens'
actions through direct sanctions, but also through its ability to convey
messages about the shared beliefs of the community as communicated by a
legal authority.10 In other words, law impacts citizens' conception of norms
by signaling the underlying attitudes of a community or society. Not only
does the passage of a law signal the underlying norms of a society, but it
also arguably amplifies and legitimizes those norms as "right" by using the
power of the state as the medium of that expression.
Moreover, legislation connotes consensus." Because the legislature is a
body of elected officials broadly representing numerous subcommunities,
legislative action inherently implies consensus between those
subcommunities. 12 The expressive function of law, therefore, is premised
Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 358-59
(2000).
Id. at 371-72.
See id. at 358-59, 364-65, 373; Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REV.
633, 635 (1995) ("[A]n assembly of several hundred men and women might have democratic
credentials . . . because taken together their diversity represents, along various dimensions,
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on the symbolic attitudinal impact of consensus among subcommunities.13
Also, because "[1]aw signals the existence of information held by the law-
maker,"14 law has an ability to convey to the governed the collective
opinion of the sovereign and of the other members of the society. 5
Democratically elected representatives must suss out the values of their
constituents in order to remain popular and electable.16 "Because legislators
have a professional interest in correctly judging approval patterns, their
enactments reveal their private information about such patterns. The law,
not the sanction, then influences behavior by causing people to update
their prior beliefs about what others approve and disapprove." 7
The following example helps clarify this theory. Recently,
Massachusetts made it unlawful to text message while driving, and the
statute punished the offense with a fine." Critics of this law argued that
enforcing this prohibition would be nearly impossible; even if police were
able to see someone allegedly texting while driving, it would be impossible
to discern whether the driver is unlawfully texting or lawfully making a
phone call. Without any plausible mechanism of enforcement, critics allege
that the law is useless.
Yet the conception of law in this manner ignores its expressive value.
The expressive function of the anti-texting law is its conveyance of a value,
apparently shared by the citizenry and officially sanctioned by the "State,"
that texting while driving is "wrong." As more members of the community
learn of the law and digest its moral message, citizens will shift their
attitudes regarding the prohibited conduct and later change their behavior.
This shift occurs not just due to fear of punishment, but due to the fear of
running afoul of social norms. Similar norm reactions via the expressive
impact of law occurred with anti-smoking campaigns and child car seat
legislation. So, how does legal expressivism help us comprehend society's
misguided obsession with SYG in the Zimmerman prosecution?
III. The Expressive Impact of Stand Your Ground Laws
Understanding the mistaken assumption of the applicability of
Florida's SYG law in the Zimmerman prosecution entails deconstructing
the messages those laws convey to citizens. Scholars have attributed the
expressive aspect of SYG laws to their historical evolution. For instance,
the diversity of the community at large. . . . In their plurality, they represent the larger
plurality of the community....").
See McAdams, supra note 10, at 342, 358-59, 371-73.
Id. at 358.
See id. at 358-59.
Id.
Id.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 13B (2010).
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one of the earlier strains of thought justifying the rejection of the English
common law rule requiring retreat was that withdrawal was not an act
befitting a "true man." For nineteenth century opponents of the retreat
rule, requiring a "true man" to flinch in the face of an attack was
downright un-American. As commentator Joseph Beale pointed out,
though, the norms that buttressed that proposition were dubious:
The feeling at the bottom of the [rule] is one beyond all law; it is
the feeling which is responsible for the duel, for war, for
lynching; the feeling which leads a jury to acquit the slayer of his
wife's paramour; the feeling which would compel a true man to
kill the ravisher of his daughter. We have outlived dueling, and
we deprecate war and lynching; but it is only because the
advance of civilization and culture has led us to control our
feelings by our will.19
Moreover, the courts opposing the retreat rule were located in the
South and the West, and as Yale's Dan Kahan explains it: "By virtue of the
slave culture in the former and the frontier culture in the latter, both of
these regions had inherited rich systems of honor that put a premium on
physical displays of courage and on violent reactions to slights." 20 Given
these origins of SYG laws, we ought to ask the question: what ideas do
these laws convey to citizens? In other words, what is the expressive value
of SYG laws?
First, commentators principally justify the common law rule of self-
defense, requiring retreat if one can do so in complete safety, on the
grounds that this formulation values human life. By contrast, SYG laws
subordinate human life to values like honor, manliness, and machismo; if
one has the option to retreat, one need not spare the life of the attacker if
one instead chooses to act in accordance with one's honor or natural
tendency of a "true man" to use violence. This connotes the idea that the
definition of a "true man" is logically inconsistent with a predisposition to
value human life as the highest value.
Second, commentators have claimed that the National Rifle Association
has succeeded in its attempts to expand SYG laws to more states by
playing on our increasing fears of violence.21 Thus, part of SYG laws'
expressive power, through the notion that "law signals the existence of
information held by the law-maker," 22 is that the State "believes" that
Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 431 (1999)
(quoting Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. REV. 567, 581
(1903)).
Kahan, supra note 19, at 432-33.
See Joshua Dressler, Feminist (or "Feminist") Reform of Self-Defense Law: Some Critical
Reflections, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1475, 1481-82 (2010) [hereinafter Dressler, Feminist]; DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING, supra note 5, at 227.
McAdams, supra note 10, at 358.
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citizens ought to be more afraid of violence, that there is an increasing
threat, and citizens should take the punishment of would-be violent
criminals into their own hands. This message alters the perception of
citizens' relationship to one another to one of fear, distrust, and a zero-
sum-game sort of perpetual antagonism.
Third, SYG laws seem also to express a social norm in favor of the
"moral forfeiture" theory of self-defense. 23 This theory holds that the
original aggressor "no longer merits our consideration, any more than an
insect or stone does." 24 By sanctioning a self-defense justification for killing
in the context of a choice by the self-defender between retreating or killing,
society is countenancing the idea that each individual possesses the right to
decide the fate of another and that an unnecessary killing is a valid moral
choice. Because an aggressor's violence forfeits their right to live, society no
longer views them as an entity worthy of consideration as a human being.
In a society that usually reserves for the State the power to judge
individuals and use violence or coercion against wrongdoers (i.e. via
punishment), ceding this power in a way that so fundamentally strips
another human being of his or her right to existence is a powerful symbolic
message.
So, how then have these expressive features of SYG laws modified
shared norms on the scope of self-defense in a way that clouded our
collective judgment in the Zimmerman case?
IV. Why America Assumed Stand Your Ground Applied to Zimmerman
The degree to which the nation seemed to buy in to the relevance of
SYG provisions is positive evidence of the existence of an expressive power
of law. If the law of self-defense had been well-settled for years, it is
unlikely that Americans would have been so quick to accept the
applicability of the SYG law to Zimmerman's case. Instead, though, the
first decade of the 2000s saw a massive upheaval in terms of the adoption
of SYG provisions. Between 2005 and 2007 as many as thirty states
considered adopting SYG laws.25 By 2010, "27 jurisdictions had
significantly expanded the scope of their self-defense provisions" by
focusing on SYG. 26
Given this recent advertising time in the mind of the public, a
condition that is particularly helpful to foster norm changes vis-h-vis the
expressive function of law, it is unsurprising that Americans seemed
amenable to presuming Zimmerman's right to use unnecessary deadly
force. This is especially true given the historical background of such laws
Dressler, Feminist, supra note 21, at 1491.
Id. (quoting Hugo Bedau, The Right to Life, 52 MONIST 550, 570 (1968)).
Dressler, supra note 5, at 227.
Id.
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and the messages they send. There is very little difference between what
SYG laws actually do and what they are perceived to do. For instance,
because SYG laws subordinate the value of human life to the value of
honor, it is unsurprising that Americans might internalize a message that
the law subordinates the value of human life to the value of protecting
one's territory. Because SYG laws impact the way citizens mediate their
perception of the danger posed to them by "others," it should not be
shocking that Americans might digest the message that Zimmerman had a
"right" to shoot first and ask questions later. Finally, because SYG laws
discharge the personhood of the "wrongdoer" and subjugate that person's
life to the whim of the "true man," it is not surprising that Americans
might accept the principle that Martin was a "wrongdoer" by being
someplace he shouldn't and set aside his personhood accordingly.
CONCLUSION
Given this effect, Massachusetts and other states should think seriously
about the messages they send by adopting SYG laws. Given the historical
antecedents of these laws-specifically the slavery and Wild West
cultures -legislators should understand the values they are tacitly
embracing. Additionally, given SYG laws' shared moral lineage with
lynching, patriarchal views of justified homicide, and dueling, legislators
ought to give serious pause before adopting values of this ilk. In
considering SYG laws states should be very aware that more is at stake
than just whether an accused is convicted or acquitted-our citizens'
conception of the value of life, their understanding of their relationship
with others, and the way we approach fundamental questions of criminal
law all are in question.
Finally, and most importantly, legislators must understand that we
cannot rule out the possibility that the expressive impact of SYG laws
overly-broadened the scope of the permissible use of deadly force in the
mind of George Zimmerman. If that is the case, and Trayvon Martin's
death is due to the warped conception of "self-defense" Zimmerman
carried forth that day, then SYG laws literally might mean the difference
between life and death.

